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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the concept of cyberterrorism. Fringe activity on the Internet ranges from non-
violent ‘Use’ at one end to ‘Cyberterrorism’ at the other. Rejecting the idea that cyberterrorism is 
widespread, the focus here is on terrorist groups’ ‘use’ of the Internet, in particular the content of their 
websites, and their ‘misuse’ of the medium, as in hacking wars, for example. Terrorist groups’ use of 
the Internet for the purpose of inter-group communication is also surveyed, partly because of its 
importance for the inter-networked forms of organisation apparently being adopted by these groups, 
but also due to the part played by the Internet in the events of 9-11 and their aftermath.  
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Introduction 
 
Analysts have been saying for some time now that the new terrorism depends 
on the information revolution and its technologies.   
 
Indeed, terrorism has long been about “information”—from the fact that 
trainees for suicide bombings are kept from listening to international 
media, through the ways that terrorists seek to create disasters that will 
consume the front pages, to the related debates about countermeasures that 
would limit freedom of the press, increase public surveillance and 
intelligence gathering, and heighten security over information and 
communications systems. Terrorist tactics focus attention on the 
importance of information and communications for the functioning of 
democratic institutions; debates about how terrorist threats undermine 
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democratic practices may revolve around freedom of information issues 
(Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini 1999, 72; see also Arquilla & Ronfeldt 
2001).  
 
Of course, the increase in information, communication, and communication 
technologies is not simply impacting terrorist groups. Information is the new lifeblood 
of the international system. World politics today transcends simple inter-national 
relations, and much of the change has taken place as a result of the spread of 
information infrastructures (Luke 2001, 113). The information revolution is driving 
dramatic changes in political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, and cultural 
affairs. In the second half of the twentieth century, economically advanced countries 
made the shift into what has been termed the ‘information society’ or the ‘information 
age.’ The futurist Alvin Toffler has labelled this transition the ‘Third Wave’ (1980), 
suggesting that it will ultimately be as consequential as the two previous waves in 
human history: from hunter gatherer to agricultural societies, and from agricultural to 
industrial ones. The rapid expansion and diffusion of new International 
Communications Technologies (ICTs), particularly evident in the growth of the 
Internet, contribute to the set of phenomena collectively labelled globalisation and cut 
across traditional temporal and spatial boundaries.  
 
In particular, both sub-state and non-state actors are said to be harnessing- or 
preparing to harness- the power of the Internet to harass and attack their foes. In 
newspapers and magazines, in film and on television, ‘cyberterrorism’ is in the 
zeitgeist. As early as 1996 John Deutch, former director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), testified: 
 
International terrorist groups clearly have the capability to attack the 
information infrastructure of the United States, even if they use relatively 
simple means. Since the possibilities for attacks are not difficult to imagine, 
I am concerned about the potential for such attacks in the future. The 
methods used could range from such traditional terrorist methods as a 
vehicle-delivered bomb -- directed in this instance against, say, a telephone 
switching centre or other communications node -- to electronic means of 
attack. The latter methods could rely on paid hackers. The ability to launch 
an attack, however, are likely to be within the capabilities of a number of 
terrorist groups, which themselves have increasingly used the Internet and 
other modern means for their own communications. The groups concerned 
include such well-known, long-established organizations as the Lebanese 
Hizballah, as well as nameless and less well-known cells of international 
terrorists such as those who attacked the World Trade Center (Deutch 1996).  
 
The Internet is neither simply a potential vehicle for carrying out attacks nor a 
potential target, however. The Internet is also the instrument of a political power shift. 
It is the first many-to-many communication system. The ability to communicate 
words, images, and sounds, which underlies the power to persuade, inform, witness, 
debate, and discuss (not to mention the power to slander, propagandise, disseminate 
bad or misleading information, engage in misinformation and/or disinformation, etc.) 
is no longer the sole province of those who own or control printing presses, radio 
stations, or television networks. Every machine connected to the Internet is potentially 
a printing press, a broadcasting station, or a place of assembly. And in the twenty first 
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century, terrorists are availing of the opportunity to connect. The Internet is an ideal 
propaganda tool for terrorists: in the past they had to communicate through acts of 
violence and hope that those acts garnered sufficient attention to publicise the 
perpetrators cause or explain their ideological justification. With the advent of the 
Internet, however, the same groups can disseminate their information undiluted by the 
media and untouched by government sensors. In 1999 it was reported that 12 of the 30 
terrorist groups deemed Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) by the United States 
Department of State had their own websites (McGirk 1999). Today, a majority of the 
33 groups on the same list have an online presence (see Table 1).1  
 
On Wednesday morning, 12 September 2001, you could still visit a Web site 
that integrated three of the wonders of modern technology: the Internet, live digital 
video, and New York City’s World Trade Center. The site allowed Internet users 
worldwide to appreciate what millions of tourists have thrilled to since Minoru 
Yamasaki’s architectural wonder was completed in 1973: the stunning 45-mile view 
from the top of the Trade Center towers. According to journalists, the caption on the 
site still read ‘Real-Time Hudson River View from World Trade Center.’ In the 
square above was a deep black nothingness. The terrorists had taken down the 
Towers; they had not taken down the Net. “[W]hereas hacktivism is real and 
widespread, cyberterrorism exists only in theory. Terrorist groups are using the 
Internet, but they still prefer bombs to bytes as a means of inciting terror,” wrote 
Dorothy Denning (2001b) just weeks before the September attacks. Terrorist ‘use’ of 
the Internet has been largely ignored, however, in favour of the more headline-
grabbing ‘cyberterrorism.’ The purpose of this paper is to help remedy that 
deficiency.  
 
To that end, this paper examines the concept of cyberterrorism. It posits a 
four-tiered representation of fringe activity on the Internet ranging from ‘Use’ at one 
end to ‘Cyberterrorism’ at the other. Rejecting the idea that cyberterrorism is 
widespread, the focus here is on terrorist groups’ ‘use’ of the Internet, in particular the 
content of the groups’ websites, and their ‘misuse’ of the medium, as in hacking wars, 
for example. Terrorist groups’ use of the Internet for the purpose of inter-group 
communication is also investigated. In this context, there is a brief exploration of the 
inter-networked forms of organisation apparently being adopted by these groups, 
followed by an analysis of the part played by the Internet in the events of 9-11 and 
their aftermath.  
 
 
What is Cyberterrorism? 
 
Cyberterrorism remains a term that lacks a clear, widely-accepted definition.  
The pejorative connotations of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ have resulted in 
some acts of computer abuse being labelled ‘cyberterrorism’. In June 2001, for 
example, a headline in the Boston Herald read ‘Cyberterrorist Must Serve Year in 
Jail’ (Richardson 2001). The story continued: “Despite a Missouri cyberterrorists plea 
for leniency, a Middlesex Superior Court judge yesterday told the wheelchair-bound 
man ‘you must be punished for what you’ve done’ to Massachusetts schoolchildren 
and ordered him to serve a year in jail.” Christian Hunold, 21, pleaded guilty to 
“launching a campaign of terror via the Internet” from his Missouri home, including 
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directing Middle School students to child pornography Web sites he posted, 
telephoning threats to the school and to the homes of some  
 
 
Table 1. United States Foreign Terrorist Organisations 2002: Websites* 
 
Organisation U R L * *  L a n g u a g e ( s )  
1. Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) N/A N/A 
2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) N/A N/A 
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade N/A N/A 
4. Armed Islamic Group (GIA) N/A N/A 
5. Asbat al-Ansar N/A N/A 
6. Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) http://www.aleph.to/index_e.html  
http://www.aleph.to  
English 
Japanese 
7. Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) http://www.contrast.org/mirrors/ehj/index.html 
http://www.batasuna.org/   
English 
Basque  
8. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) http://www.azzam.com  English 
9. Hamas http://www.palestine-info.com/hamas  Arabic, English 
10. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) http://www.ummah.net.pk/harkat/  Arabic, English 
11. Hizbollah http://www.hizbollah.org  Arabic, English 
12. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan  N/A N/A 
13. Jaish-e-Mohammed  N/A N/A 
14. Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) N/A N/A 
15. Kahane Chai (Kach) http://www.kahane.org  English 
16. Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) http://www.pkk.org/index.html  Kurdish 
17. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba http://www.markazdawa.org.pk/  Arabic, English 
18. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  http://www.eelamweb.com/  English 
19. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization  http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/index.html  English 
20. National Liberation Army (ELN), 
Colombia 
http://www.eln-voces.com/  Spanish 
21. Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) http://www.entifada.net/  Arabic 
22. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) N/A N/A 
23. Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) 
http://www.pflp-pal.org/main.html  English 
24. Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC) 
N/A N/A 
25. al-Qaida http://www.alneda.com  Arabic 
26. Real IRA N/A N/A 
27. Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) 
http://www.farc-ep.org/  English, Spanish, 
Portuguese, Italian, 
German, Russian 
28. Revolutinary Nuclei (formerly ELA) N/A N/A 
29. Revolutionary Organization 17 
November (17 November) 
N/A N/A 
30. Revolutionary People’s Liberation 
Party/Front (DHKP/C, Dev Sol) 
http://www.ozgurluk.org  English 
31. Salafist Group for Call and Combat  N/A N/A 
32. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) http://www.csrp.org/  Spanish, English 
33. United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC) 
http://colombia-libre.org/colombialibre/pp.asp  Spanish 
 
* Lists the 33 groups that were designated by the United States Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist 
Organisations (FTOs) as of April 30, 2002, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, as amended by the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 
** Some groups maintain more than one website; the URLs listed here are the group’s official pages  
as far as is practicable.  
 
 5 
children, and posting a picture of the school’s principal with bullet holes in his head 
and chest on the Net. But is this cyberterrorism? And if not, why not? 
 
Barry Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and 
Intelligence in California, coined the term ‘cyberterrorism’ in the 1980s. The concept 
is composed of two elements: cyberspace and terrorism. Cyberspace may be 
conceived of as “that place in which computer programs function and data moves” 
(Collin 1996). Terrorism is a less easily defined term. In fact, most scholarly texts 
devoted to the study of terrorism contain a section, chapter, or chapters devoted to a 
discussion of how difficult it is to define the term (see Gearty 1991; Guelke 1998; 
Hoffman 1998; Holms 1994; Schmid & Jongman 1988; Wardlaw 1982). In this paper 
I will employ the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States 
Code, Section 2656f(d).2 That statute contains the following definition:  
 
The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
 
Combining these definitions results in the construction of a narrowly drawn working 
definition of cyberterrorism as follows:  
 
cyberterrorism refers to premeditated, politically motivated attacks by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents against information, computer 
systems, computer programs, and data that result in violence against non-
combatant targets (Denning 1999, 2 & 27; Pollitt n.d.).  
 
A similar definition of cyberterrorism has been put forward by Professor 
Dorothy Denning in numerous articles and interviews, and in her testimony on the 
subject before the United States Congress’s House Armed Services Committee 
(Denning 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999). According to Denning: 
 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to 
unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and 
the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a 
government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence 
against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. 
Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic 
loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures 
could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that 
disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would 
not.  
 
When it comes to discussion of cyberterrorism, there are two basic areas in 
which clarification is needed. One has to do with the confusion between 
cyberterrorism and cybercrime. Such confusion is partly caused by the lack of clear 
definitions of the two phenomena. A UN manual on IT-related crime recognises that, 
even after several years of debate among experts on just what constitutes cybercrime 
and what cyberterrorism, “there is no internationally recognised definition of those 
terms” (Mates 2001). The second has to do with making clear distinctions between 
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two different facets of terrorist usage of information technology: terrorist use of 
computers as a facilitator of their activities, and terrorism involving computer 
technology as a weapon or target. Utilising the definitions outlined above, it is 
possible to resolve both difficulties. Cybercrime and cyberterrorism are not 
coterminous. Cyberspace attacks must have a ‘terrorist’ component in order to be 
labelled cyberterrorism. The attacks must instil terror as commonly understood (that 
is, result in death and/or large-scale destruction), and they must have a political 
motivation. As regards the distinction between terrorist use of information technology 
and terrorism involving computer technology as a weapon/target, only the latter may 
be defined as cyberterrorism. Terrorist ‘use’ of computers as a facilitator of their 
activities, whether for propaganda, communication, or other purposes, is simply that: 
‘use.’ 
 
Kent Anderson, senior vice-president of IT security and Investigations for 
information security firm Control Risks Group, has devised a three-tiered schema for 
categorising fringe activity on the Internet, utilising the terms ‘Use,’ ‘Misuse,’ and 
‘Offensive Use.’ Anderson explains: 
 
Use is simply using the Internet/WWW to facilitate communications via e-
mails and mailing lists, newsgroups and websites. In almost every case, 
this activity is simply free speech…Misuse is when the line is crossed 
from expression of ideas to acts that disrupt or otherwise compromise 
other sites. An example of misuse is Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks 
against websites. In the physical world, most protests are allowed, 
however, [even] if the protests disrupt other functions of society such as 
train service or access to private property…The same should be true for 
online activity. Offensive use is the next level of activity where actual 
damage or theft occurs. The physical world analogy would be a riot where 
property is damaged or people are injured. An example of this type of 
activity online is the recent attack on systems belonging to the world 
economic forum, where personal information of high profile individuals 
was stolen (Weisenburger 2001, 2). 
 
Combining Anderson’s schema with the definition of cyberterrorism outlined above it 
is possible to construct a four-level scale of the uses of the Internet for political 
activism by unconventional actors, ranging from ‘Use’ at one end of the spectrum to 
‘Cyberterrorism’ at the other. Unfortunately, such a schema has not generally been 
employed in the literature nor in the field of public policy. This is particularly 
disquieting given that the vast majority of terrorist activity on the Internet is limited to 
‘Use.’ 
 
 
‘Use’ and ‘Misuse’: Some Empirical Observations 
 
Researchers are still unclear whether the ability to communicate online 
worldwide has resulted in an increase or a decrease in terrorist acts. It is agreed, 
however, that online activities substantially improve the ability of such terrorist 
groups to raise funds, lure new faithful, and reach a mass audience (Arquilla, Ronfeldt 
& Zanini 1999, 66; Piller 2001). The most popular terrorist sites draw tens of 
thousands of visitors each month. 
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Hizbollah,5 a Lebanese-based Shi’ite Islamic group, established their 
collection of websites in 1995. They currently manage three such sites: one for the 
Central Press Office, another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets,6 and the last Al 
Manar TV for news and information.7 All three may be viewed in either English or 
Arabic.8 The Central Press Office site contains an introduction to the group, press 
cuttings and statements, political declarations, and speeches of the group’s Secretary 
General. One may also access a photo gallery, video and audio clips. The information 
contained in these pages is updated regularly. In the event that one would like to find 
out more, contact information, in the form of an e-mail address, is provided. In a 
similar vein, Hamas’ Web site presents political cartoons, streaming video clips and 
photomontages depicting the violent deaths of Palestinian children.9 It has been 
claimed that the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a fundamentalist sect warring with the 
Algerian government, posted a detailed bomb-making manual on their site.10 The 
online home of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), a liberation army in Sri Lanka best known 
for the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, offers 
position papers, daily news, an online store- for sale are books and pamphlets, videos, 
audio tapes, CDs, a 2002 calendar, and the Tamil Eelam flag- and free e-mail 
services. Other terrorist sites host electronic bulletin boards, post tips on smuggling 
money to finance their operations, and provide automated registration for e-mail 
alerts. 
 
Many terrorist group sites are hosted in the United States. For example, a 
Connecticut-based ISP was providing co-location and virtual hosting services for the 
Hamas site in data centers located in Connecticut and Chicago (Lyman 2002). While 
sites such as that maintained by Hamas are likely to be subject to more intense 
scrutiny following the September attacks, similar websites were the subject of debate 
in the United States previous to the events of 9-11. In 1997 controversy erupted when 
it was revealed that the State University of New York (SUNY) at Binghampton was 
hosting the website of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a 
Tupac Amaru (MRTA) solidarity site was operating out of the University of 
California at San Diego (UCSD). SUNY officials promptly shut down the FARC site. 
In San Diego it was decided to err on the side of free speech and the Tupac Amaru 
site remains in operation (Collier 1997).11  Interestingly, the FARC site now also 
operates out of UCSD. It is not illegal to host such a site, even if a group is deemed an 
FTO by the United States Department of State, as long as a site is not seeking 
financial contributions nor providing financial support to the group. Other content is 
generally considered to be protected speech under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States.  
 
It’s not all plain sailing for these ‘netizens’, however. Their homepages have 
been subject to intermittent DoS and other hack attacks and there have also been 
strikes against their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that have resulted in more 
permanent difficulties. In 1997, for example, an e-mail bombing was conducted 
against the Institute for Global Communications (IGC),12 a San Francisco-based ISP, 
hosting the Web pages of the Euskal Herria or Basque Country Journal, a publication 
edited by supporters of the Basque group Homeland and Liberty (ETA). The attacks 
against IGC commenced following the assassination by ETA of a popular town 
councillor in northern Spain. The protestors wanted the site pulled from the Internet. 
To accomplish this they bombarded IGC with thousands of spurious e-mails routed 
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through hundreds of different mail relays, spammed IGC staff and customer accounts, 
clogged their Web page with bogus credit card orders, and threatened to employ the 
same tactics against other organisations using IGC services. IGC pulled the Euskal 
Herria site on July 18, but not before archiving a copy of the site enabling others to 
put up mirrors. Shortly thereafter, mirror sites appeared on half a dozen servers on 
three continents. Despite this, the protestors e-mail action raised fears of a new era of 
censorship imposed by direct action from anonymous hacktivists. Furthermore, 
approximately one month after IGC pulled the controversial site off its servers, 
Scotland Yard’s Anti-Terrorist Squad shut down Internet Freedom’s UK Web site for 
hosting the journal. Scotland Yard claimed to be acting against terrorism (Denning 
1999, 20-21).13 
 
The so-called ‘cyberwar’ that raged between Israelis and Palestinians and their 
supporters in 2000 was a mere nuisance in comparison with such targeted and 
sustained campaigns. The Mideast ‘cyberwar’ began on November- about three weeks 
after Hizbollah seized three Israeli soldiers on patrol in the Sheba’a Farms area of 
south Lebanon and held them for ransom- when pro-Israeli hackers created a website 
to host FloodNet attacks. Within days, Hizbollah’s site was flooded by millions of 
‘pings’- the cyber-equivalent of knocks on the door- and crashed. Hezbollah then tried 
reviving the site under slightly different spellings, but they too came under sustained 
attack. In all, six different Hizbollah sites, the Hamas site, and other Palestinian 
informational sites were victims of the FloodNet device (Gentile 2000a, 2000b; 
Hockstader 2000). Hizbollah’s Central Press Office site came under attack once again 
when the group posted video clips of Israeli ground attacks on Palestinians in Gaza. 
Hizbollah then increased their server capacity in order to ward off further attacks 
(Gentile 2000a). These efforts notwithstanding, pro-Israeli hackers successfully 
hacked into the Hizbollah Web site a further time on December 26. They posted 
pictures of the 3 Israeli soldiers who were abducted in early October and the slogan 
“Free Our Soldiers Now” on a screen full of blue and white Star of David flags 
(Hosein 2001).14 In addition, a group called Hackers of Israel Unite allegedly crashed 
the Almanar TV site using one computer with a 56K modem, an ADSL line, and a 
popular tool called WinSmurf that enables one to conduct a mass pinging (Gentile 
2000b).  
 
According to Hizbollah’s then-Webmaster, Ali Ayoub, “Our counterattack is 
just to remain on the Net” (Hosein 2001). The Palestinians and their supporters were 
not long in striking back, however. In a coordinated counterattack, the Web sites of 
the Israeli army, Foreign Ministry, prime minister and parliament, among others were 
hit (Hockstader 2000). On a single day, December 29, 80 Israel-related sites were 
hacked and defaced by pro-Palestinian hackers. It is estimated that, in all, more than 
246 Israeli-related sites were attacked between October 2000 and 1 January 2001 as 
compared with approximately 34 Palestinian-related sites that were hit in the same 
period (Hosein 2001). The success of the Palestinian counterattack-variously dubbed 
the ‘e-jihad,’ ‘cyber-jihad,’ or ‘inter-fada’- may be explained by the way in which the 
pro-Palestinian hackers systematically worked their way through sites with dot-il 
domain names. Palestinian-related sites are generally harder to find because, although 
in March 2000 dot-ps was delegated the country code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) for 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, only one such domain is currently operational 
(gov.ps) (see Cisneros 2001),15 and not many groups have such easily identifiable 
URLs as Hezbollah. In addition, there are approximately 2 million Internet hookups in 
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Israel, which is considerably more than any other Middle Eastern country (see Table 
1). The upshot of this is that the Israeli’s have a far greater online presence than the 
Palestinians and their supporters in the Arab world and are therefore more easily 
targeted. 
 
 
(Inter)Networking and 9-11 
 
In their recent work Rand’s John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele 
Zanini point to the emergence of new forms of terrorist organisation attuned to the 
information age. They contend, “terrorists will continue to move from hierarchical 
toward information-age network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of 
transnationally internetted groups than into building stand alone groups” (Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt & Zanini 1999, 41). This type of organisational structure is qualitatively 
different from traditional hierarchical designs. In the future, terrorists are likely to be 
organised to act in a more fully networked, decentralised, “all-channel” manner. 
Ideally, there is no single, central leadership, command or headquarters. Within the 
network as a whole there is little or no hierarchy and there may be multiple leaders 
depending upon the size of the group. In other words, there is no specific heart or 
head that can be targeted. To realise its potential, such a network must utilise the 
latest information and communications technologies. The Internet is becoming an 
integral component of such organisations, according to the Rand analysts (Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt & Zanini 1999, 48-53; Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001). 
 
The militias or patriot movement in the United States are known to have 
adopted inter-networked forms of organisation similar to those outlined above. While 
the anonymity of the Internet is seen as fuelling the conspiracies of the militias, for 
the groups themselves access to such new technologies is seen as a vital tool for 
recruitment and funding (in a similar way to terrorist organisations). The Internet has 
enabled the militias to spread their ideas worldwide. There are militias in Australia 
and Canada, and it has been suggested that the Far Right in Europe has adopted the 
idea of ‘leaderless resistance’ via the Internet (Mulloy 1999, 16; see also Hoffman 
1998, 105-120 and Levin 2002, 964-966). Activists within the patriot movement have 
repeatedly urged their compatriots, not only to organise themselves along networked 
lines, however, but also to opt out of other more pervasive networks that are viewed 
as dangerously perceptible to attack: “We need to set up our own cashless societies, 
our own barter networks, and unhook from the grid, to become self-sufficient, away 
from the power company, the gas company, and the water company” (Mulloy 1999, 
324; see also Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001). At the same time that the militias are 
unhooking from the grid, however, it is asserted that terrorist groups are more 
networked than ever before. 
 
The adoption of such inter-networked forms of organisation by terrorist groups 
has not been sufficiently researched. However, since the events of 9-11 a clearer 
picture has begun to emerge of the way in which the Internet might be used to support 
such organisational structures. The abilities of intelligence officials to eavesdrop on e-
mail and phone calls, was supposed to help prevent attacks such as those that occurred 
in New York and Washington from ever coming to successful fruition, but they did 
not and, as a result, assumptions about the role the Internet can play in fighting 
terrorism are being revised. Investigators are now turning to Internet tools in their 
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investigation as never before (Schwartz 2001). What role has the Internet played in 
the investigation of the attacks thus far? Importantly, what can be done online to track 
the group depends in large part on what the group did online. In a briefing given in 
late September, FBI Assistant Director Ronald Dick, head of the United States 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC),16 told reporters that the hijackers 
had used the Net, and “used it well.”   
 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks federal agents issued subpoenas and 
search warrants to just about every major Internet company, including America 
Online, Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, and many smaller providers. It is known that the 
hijackers booked at least nine of their airline tickets for the four doomed flights online 
at least two to three weeks prior to the attacks. They also used the Internet to find 
information about the aerial application of pesticides. Investigators are said to have in 
their possession hundreds of e-mails linked to the terrorists in English, Arabic and 
Urdu. The messages were sent within the United States and internationally. According 
to the FBI, a number of these messages include operational details of the attacks. 
Some of the hijackers used e-mail services that are largely anonymous- Hotmail, for 
example- and created multiple temporary accounts. A number of them are known to 
have used public terminals, in libraries and elsewhere, to gain access to the Net, 
whereas others used privately owned personal or laptop computers to do so (Cohen 
2001; Fallis & Cha 2001, A24). 
 
In two successive briefings, senior FBI officials stated that the agency had 
found no evidence that the hijackers used electronic encryption methods to 
communicate on the Internet. This has not prevented politicians and journalists 
repeating lurid rumours that the coded orders for the attacks were secretly hidden 
inside pornographic Web images (Cohen 2001; Gibson 2001; Lyman 2001), or from 
making claims that the attacks could have been prevented had Western governments 
been given the power to prevent Internet users from employing encryption in their 
communications17 (Cha 2001b). Although many e-mail messages sent to and from key 
members of the hijack teams were uncovered and studied, none of them, according to 
the FBI, used encryption. Nor did they use steganography, a technique which allows 
an encrypted file to be hidden inside a larger file (such as a ‘.jpeg’ or ‘.gif’ image, or 
an ‘.mp3’ music file). Evidence from questioning terrorists involved in previous 
attacks, both in America and on American interests abroad, and monitoring their 
messages reveals that they simply used code words to make their communications 
appear innocuous to eavesdroppers.  
 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini have also pointed to the way in which 
difficulties coping with terrorism will increase if terrorists move beyond isolated 
attacks towards new approaches that emphasise campaigns based on swarming. They 
point out that while little analytic attention has been paid to swarming, it is likely to 
be a key mode of conflict in the information age (1999, 41). In their Countering the 
New Terrorism, Arquilla et al describe this new technique thus:  
 
Swarming occurs when the dispersed nodes of a network of small (and 
perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from multiple directions. 
The overall aim is the sustainable pulsing of force or fire. Once in motion, 
swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, 
then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new 
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pulse. In other words, information age attacks may come in ‘swarms’ 
rather than the more traditional ‘waves’ (1999, 53-54). 
 
This device points to the adaptable, flexible, and versatile nature of offensive 
networks with regard to opportunities and challenges. The fact that the 9-11 hijackers 
employed a technique similar to the one described above has given the Rand analysts’ 
work a far higher profile than might otherwise have been expected. Far from being 
innovative or under-utilised, however, swarming has been employed by hacktivists- 
including those acting in support of terrorist organisations- for some time. As Dorothy 
Denning has pointed out, cases such as that involving the Euskal Herria Journal and 
other similar incidents illustrate the power of such tools. Despite the ISPs willingness 
to host the site, IGC simply could not sustain the attack and remain in business. On 
the other hand, such cases also illustrate the power of the Internet as an organ of free 
speech: because venues for publication on the Internet are so rich and diverse and 
dispersed throughout the world, it is extremely difficult for hacktivists and 
governments alike to banish from the Net content they deem offensive using 
swarming or any other techniques (Denning 1999, 21). 
 
 
The Internet and 9-11: The Aftermath 
 
Authorities have been keeping a watchful eye on Web sites perceived as extremist for 
a number of years. In February 1998, Dale Watson, chief of the International 
Terrorism section of the FBI, informed a United States Senate committee that major 
terrorist groups used the Internet to spread propaganda and recruit new members 
(Gruner & Naik 2001; Liu 2001). Previous to 9-11, however, the authorities were not 
entitled to interfere with such sites for legal reasons. Since that time, the FBI have 
been involved in the official closure of what appears to be hundreds- if not thousands- 
of sites. Several radical Internet radio shows, including IRA radio, Al Lewis Live and 
Our Americas, were pulled by an Indiana ISP in late September 2001 after they were 
contacted by the FBI and advised that their assets could be seized for promoting 
terrorism. The New York-based IRA Radio was accused of supporting the Real IRA. 
The site contained an archive of weekly radio programmes said to back the dissident 
Irish republicans. The archive of political interviews from the programme Al Lewis 
Live, hosted by iconoclastic actor/activist Lewis,18 drew some 15,000 hits a day. Our 
Americas was a Spanish-language programme about rebels in Latin America 
(Kornblum 2001; Scheeres 2001).19 Yahoo! has pulled dozens of sites in the Jihad 
Web Ring, a coalition of 55 jihad-related sites, while Lycos Europe established a 20-
person team to monitor its websites for illegal activity and to remove terrorist-related 
content (Gruner & Naik 2001; Scheeres 2001). 
 
In August 2001, the Taliban outlawed the use of the Internet in Afghanistan, 
except at the fundamentalist group’s headquarters. The Taliban, nevertheless, 
maintained a prominent home on the Internet despite United Nations sanctions, 
retaliatory hack attacks, and the vagaries of the United States bombing campaign. The 
unofficial Web site of Dharb-i-Mumin, an organisation named by the United States on 
a list of terrorist groups, is still operational.20  Another site, entitled ‘Taliban Online,’ 
contained information including instructions on how to make financial donations, or 
donations of food and clothing, to the Afghan militia, but is no longer operational. In 
addition, a United States-based Web site operated by the group was shut down in late 
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September 2001 following a request from the United States Treasury Department to 
the group’s Kansas City-based ISP (NIPC 2001c, 1).  
 
One of the larger jihad-related sites still in operation is Azzam.com.21 The site 
is run by Azzam Publications a London-based publisher. The Azzam site is available 
in more than a dozen languages and offers primers including ‘How Can I Train 
Myself for Jihad.’ A number of Azzam’s affiliates were shut down after people 
complained to the ISPs hosting the sites (at least one, following a request from the 
FBI). The British company Swift Internet, which was the technical and billing contact 
for an Azzam site, is said to have received threatening e-mails accusing it of 
supporting a terrorist website. Swift has since distanced itself from the site by 
removing its name as a contact on public Internet records. Meanwhile, as often as the 
site is shut down, it is replaced by a substitute/mirror site under a different URL. Said 
the Azzam spokesperson: “One cannot shut down the Internet” (Gruner & Naik 
2001). 
 
At the present time American officials are said to be searching the Internet for 
the reappearance of an Arabic language website that they believe has been used by al-
Qaida. Statements ostensibly made by al-Qaida and Taliban members have appeared 
on the site Alneda.com.22 The site, which is registered in Singapore, appeared on Web 
servers in Malaysia and Texas in early June 2002, before it was shut down by 
American officials. The site is thought to have first appeared on the Net in early 
February 2002. It is expected to reappear under a numerical address in an effort to 
make it harder for American officials to track down. According to media accounts, the 
site contained audio and video clips of Osama bin Laden; pictures of al-Qaida 
suspects currently detained in Pakistan; a message claiming to be from al-Qaida 
spokesman Sualaiman Abu Ghaith, in which he warned of new attacks upon the 
United States; and a series of articles claiming that suicide bombings aimed at 
Americans are justifiable under Islamic law (Iqbal 2002; Kelley 2002). There has 
been media speculation that the site is being used to direct al-Qaida operational cells. 
According to one report the site has carried low-level operational information: in 
February it published the names and home phone numbers of al-Qaida fighters 
captured by Pakistan following their escape from fighting in Afghanistan with the aim 
that sympathisers would contact their families and let them know they were alive 
(Eedle 2002). Click on Alneda.com today and the following appears: Hacked, 
Tracked, and NOW Owned by the USA. The site is described as “a mostly 
unmoderated discussion board relating to current world affairs surrounding Islamic 
Jihad [sic] and the US led war on terrorism (plus other conflicts around the globe).” 
Not only does the domain name Alneda.com point to this site, but the URL 
Nukeafghanisatn.com also points to this discussion board.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the bulk of the evidence to date shows that terrorist groups are 
making widespread use if the Internet, but so far they have not resorted to 
cyberterrorism, or shown the inclination to move heavily in this direction.  In keeping 
with this reality, Richard Clarke, White House special adviser for Cyberspace 
Security, has said that he prefers not to use the term ‘cyberterrorism,’ instead, he 
favours the term ‘information security’ or ‘cyberspace security,’ since at this stage 
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terrorists have only used the Internet for propaganda, communications, and 
fundraising (Wynne 2002). In a similar vein, Michael Vatis, former head of the 
United States National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), has stated that 
“Terrorists are already using technology for sophisticated communications and fund-
raising activities. As yet we haven’t seen computers being used by these groups as 
weapons to any significant degree, but he, like others, warns that this will probably 
happen in the future” (Veltman 2001). Indeed, According to a recent study, 75% of 
Internet users worldwide believe that ‘cyberterrorists’ may “soon inflict massive 
casualties on innocent lives by attacking corporate and governmental computer 
networks.” The survey, conducted in 19 major cities around the world, found that 
45% of respondents agreed completely that “computer terrorism will be a growing 
problem,” and another 35% agreed somewhat with the same statement (Poulsen 
2001). The problem certainly can’t shrink much, hovering as it does at zero 
cyberterrorism incidents per year. That’s not to say that cyberterrorism cannot happen 
or will not happen, but that, contrary to popular perception, it has not happened yet. 
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Notes 
 
1. The European Union (EU) has recently updated its list of prohibited organisations 
(see http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/70413.pdf). Canada is the latest country to 
establish such a list ( see http://www.sgc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-
terrorism/AntiTerrorism_e.asp).   
  
 
2. Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) may be viewed online at 
http://www.lii.warwick.ac.uk/uscode/22/2656f.html. This is the definition employed 
in the United States Department of State’s annual report entitled Patterns of Global 
Terrorism. These are available online at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/. 
 
3. Furthermore, ISPs in the UK may be legally required to monitor some customers’ 
surfing habits if requested to do so by the police under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000.  
 
4. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 was signed into 
law by American President George Bush in October 2001. The law gives government 
investigators broad powers to track wireless phone calls, listen to voicemail, intercept 
e-mail messages and monitor computer use, among others. I cannot enter into a 
discussion of the Act here due to limitations of space. However, the full text of the 
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Act is available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/patriot.pdf (Section 
1016 pertains to critical infrastructure protection). See also Johnson 2001; Matthews 
2001. 
 
5. Also Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hezbullah, Hezbollah, etc., a.k.a Islamic Jihad, 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation, Organisation of the Oppressed on Earth, and 
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. 
 
6. Accessible at http://www.moqawama.tv/.  
 
7. Online at http://www.manartv.com.  
 
8. In addition, see http://www.nasrollah.org the home page of Sayed Hassan 
Nasrallah, the General Secretary of Hizbollah, in Arabic, English and French. 
 
9. The Hamas site if off-line at time of writing. 
 
10. I have not, as yet, been able to locate the GIA site. 
 
11. The Tupac Amaru Solidarity Page hosted by UCSD is at 
http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/mrta.htm. The official homepage of the MRTA (in Europe) 
may be accessed at  http://www.voz-rebelde.de. The latter page is available in 
English, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, Turkish, and Serbo-Croat translations. The Tupac 
Amaru were on the United States list of FTOs until 2001 when they were removed.  
 
12. Online at http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/index.html.  
 
13. For more information on the e-mail bombing and IGC’s response to it see 
http://www.igc.apc.org/ehj/. Also the press release issued by Internet Freedom UK in 
response to the shutting of their operations by Scotland Yard: 
http://www.fitug.de/debate/9709/msg00018.html. The group’s website is located at 
http://www.netfreedom.org.  
 
14. In October 2000, a number of media outlets in the United States and Europe were 
contacted by a group claiming that hackers had defaced a Hizbollah site. When 
journalists accessed the site they were greeted by the Israeli flag, Hebrew text and a 
tinny piano recording of Hatikva, the Israeli national anthem. This prompted several 
news organisations to report that Hizbollah’s Central Press Office site had been 
defaced by pro-Israeli hackers (see Hockstader 2000; Piller 2001). Only later did it 
become apparent that the site at hizbolla.org (which is no longer operational) was a 
fraud that had been established by an unidentified individual or group using an 
address in Lebanon (Garrison & Grand 2001, 7).  
 
15. The official website of the Palestinian National Authority at 
http://www.pna.gov.ps/ is accessible at time of writing. I have experienced difficulties 
accessing this site in the past.  
 
16. The Clinton administration spearheaded the first major American effort to upgrade 
computer security in government and business against cybercrime. President Bill 
Clinton issued an order in May 1998 establishing the National Infrastructure 
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Protection Center, a collaboration between law enforcement, military and intelligence 
organisations to increase defences against computer crime. The centre also developed 
an information-sharing network with major industrial sectors (Schwartz 2001). 
 
17. In Britain, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw provoked a storm of protest by 
suggesting on the BBC that the media and civil liberties campaigners had paved the 
way for the terror attacks on America by advocating free speech and favouring 
publicly available encryption. 
 
18. Formerly Grandpa on the 1960s hit TV show ‘The Munsters’! 
 
19. Al Lewis Live, can still be heard on Pacifica Radio. The IRA Radio site is back 
online since March 2002 at http://www.iraradio.com. The other sites remain offline. 
 
20. Online at http://dharb-i-mumin.cjb.net/.  
 
21. The site http://www.azzam.com is accessible intermittently. Qoqaz.net 
(http://www.qoqaz.net) is an Azzam mirror, as is http://www.azzam.co.uk.  In the 
event that none of these sites are online, there may be information on Azzam’s new 
location on the site http://www.maktabah.net/home.asp.  
 
22. The site has also appeared at the URL http://www.drasat.com.  
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